INEFFICIENCY AND ABUSE OF COMPULSORY LAND ACQUISITION--AN ENQUIRY INTO THE WAY FORWARD by RAM SINGH
       CDE 







INEFFICIENCY AND ABUSE OF COMPULSORY 
LAND ACQUISITION: 











Delhi School of Economics   


















Centre for Development Economics 




Inefficiency and Abuse of Compulsory Land Acquisition:                                 
An enquiry into the way forward  
 
 







This  paper  focuses  on  two  issues:  the  problems  with  the  compulsory  acquisition  of  land,  and  the 
regulatory and institutional impediments that obstruct voluntary land transactions. We argue that any 
compulsory acquisition based process is intrinsically inefficient and unfair, even if it is accompanied by 
presumably benevolent schemes such as land-for-land and the R&R packages. Moreover, it is inherently 
prone to litigation. We demonstrate how what we call the ‘regulatory hold-up’ precludes a large number 
of potential transactions in agriculture land, and puts a downward pressure on land prices. The paper 
offers suggestions for reforming  the legal and regulatory framework  governing the land and its use.  
Finally, we discuss the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation & Resettlement (LARR) Bill 2011. We show 
that the bill leaves open several backdoors for the states to favour companies. Moreover, it fails to address 
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1.  Introduction 
The Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation & Resettlement (LARR) Bill 2011 has been introduced 
in  the  Lok  Sabha.  The  stated  aim  of  the  bill  is  to  rectify  the  failings  of  the  archaic  Land 
Acquisition Act 1894, which is the existing law on compulsory acquisition of land and private 
properties.  Besides,  the  bill  aims  to  facilitate  transfer  of  land  from  agriculture  to  other 
developmental activities while safeguarding the interests of the affected people. The bill has 
several laudable provisions. The most important is the restriction of the scope of the emergency 
clause made notorious by its frequent misuse by the states. Moreover, the bill recognizes that 
acquisition of agriculture land affects not only the owners but also many others dependent on it 
for their livelihood. So, it seeks to protect the welfare of all affected parties by creating legal 
entitlement to compensation and rehabilitation & resettlement (R&R) for the owners as well as 
other livelihood losers.  
At the same time, by diluting the crucial public-private distinction, the bill allows compulsory 
acquisition of land for all sorts of activities of private companies. Indeed, the proposed law 
significantly  expands  the scope of  eminent domain – that is,  the power of the  state and its 
agencies  to  compulsorily  acquire  private  property  for  ‘public  purpose’  activities.  This  paper 
argues that any eminent domain based process is intrinsically inefficient and unfair, even if it 
involves compulsory acquisition of only a fraction of the required land. Moreover, by discussing 
several forms of eminent domain proposed in some recent works on the subject, it is argued these 
problems cannot be avoided even if the compulsory acquisition is accompanied by presumably 
benevolent  schemes,  such  as  compensation  in  the  form  of  land-for-land  and/or  the  R&R 
packages.  
We also argue that the use of the compulsory acquisition power is inherently prone to litigation 
over  compensation.  Furthermore,  the  litigation  over  compensation  is  socially  inefficient  and 
regressive in its effects; it is relatively much more profitable for the owners of the high-value 
properties.  These claims are corroborated by using a data-set compiled from 525 judgments of 
the Additional District Judge (ADJ) courts in Delhi. 
Nonetheless, the LARR bill seeks to rationalize the compulsory acquisition of land by appealing 
to a growing national need for industrialization, urbanization and development in general. The 
bill seems to be guided by the perception that in the absence of compulsory acquisition, many 
developmental  projects  will  get  held-up.  This  view  is  also  shared  by  several  works  on  the 
subject.  
This paper, in contrast, argues that it is the regulatory hold-up and not the hold-out by the owners 
that  is  the  biggest  impediment  for  voluntary  transactions  in  land.  At  present,  the  use  of 
agricultural land for other purposes is subject to many obstructive regulations. We demonstrate 
that these regulations preclude a large number of potential transactions. Moreover, they put a 3 
 
heavy  downward  pressure  on  the  transaction  prices.  Rather  than  increasing  the  scope  of 
compulsory acquisition, there is a need to facilitate transfer of land from agriculture to other 
purposes  through  voluntary  transactions.  This  calls  for  immediate  reforms  in  the  legal  and 
regulatory framework governing the land and its use. The paper offers some helpful suggestions.  
Finally, we discuss the LARR bill. We argue that the bill in its present form fails to address some 
of the ongoing abuses of the power of eminent domain. The bill leaves open several backdoors 
for the states to favour the powerful and private companies at the expense of the rights of the 
farmer  and  the  forest  dweller.  Moreover,  it  fails  to  address  the  fundamental  causes  behind 
rampant disputes and litigation over compensation. If anything, its provisions are likely to further 
intensify the litigation over compensation.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the prominent abuses of the 
eminent domain powers by the states in India. It also analyses the causes behind the widespread 
disputes  and  litigation  over  compensation.  Section  3  examines  the  merits  and  de-merits  of 
compulsory land acquisition. By discussing various forms of eminent domain as suggested in 
various  works  on  the  subject,  this  section  shows  that  there  are  inherent  problems  with 
compulsory land acquisition even in its most benign forms. Section 4 argues why the voluntary 
transactions are superior to the compulsory acquisition. This section also demonstrates how the 
regulatory hold-up is the principal factor behind the lack of voluntary land transactions. Section 
5  discusses  the  relevant  legal  and  regulatory  frameworks,  and  offers  some  suggestions  for 
facilitating voluntary land transactions. Section 6 discusses the LARR bill and provides further 
suggestions for improving the land acquisition laws.  
2. Eminent Domain in India 
 
2.1 Misused Public Purpose The history of eminent domain in India is a saga of unmitigated 
abuse of the land acquisition laws by the state governments. The states have been repeatedly 
misusing the power of eminent domain to acquire land for companies. Moreover, they have been 
using emergency powers for the purpose, in strict violation of not only the spirit but also the 
letter of the law. Some of the other notable abuses of the extant law are: acquisition of land citing 
some  public-purpose  but  covertly  diverting  it  to  private  ends;  adoption  of  pick-and-choose 
method  for  selecting  project  site;  and  the  use  of  the  de-notification  clause  to  exempt  land 
belonging to the powerful but simultaneously acquiring all neighboring properties.  
 
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (LAA) is archaic and has several ambiguities. The states have 
repeatedly exploited the ambiguities to compulsorily acquire land for the benefit of companies 
and the powerful. Part VII of the Act allows acquisition for the private companies. However, 
sections  38-44  of  this  part  impose  several  restrictions  on  private  purpose  acquisition.  For 4 
 
instance, there is no provision for emergency acquisition. Besides, the company and the state 
government are required to sign an agreement stating the purpose of acquisition. The agreement 
must specify the terms on which general public will be entitled to use the services provided by 
the company. The objective behind these riders is to restrict the compulsory acquisition to those 
activities of companies from which public can benefit directly; such as, housing for workers, 
setting up of schools and hospitals, etc.  
These conditions on private purpose acquisitions notwithstanding, the states have acquired land 
for all sorts of activities of companies, including the ones that cannot even remotely serve any 
public  purpose;  for  example,  for  setting  up  of  shoe  manufacturing  factories,  air  conditioner 
compressor plants, hotels and swimming pools!
1 Moreover, acquisition has largely been done 
using  the  emergency  clause   that  allows  the  acqu iring  authority  to  dispense  with  several 
procedures - such as, hearing of objections against the acquisition of the targeted land - meant to 
guard against potential misuses of the law.   Large tracks of  forest land and other common 
property resources have been acquired in violation of not only the LAA but also the Forest 
Rights Act and other laws governing common property resources.    How have these blatant 
violations of the law been possible?    
In order to bypass the restraining provisions of Part VII, the states have frequently acquired land 
for  companies under Part  II  of  the  LAA. This  part concerns acquisitions  by  government 
departments for public purpose. Understandably, it does not impose the above restrictions on 
acquisition for companies. However, the act is ambiguous as to when acquisition for companies 
can be undertaken under Part II. Exploiting this ambiguity, the states have used this part for 
private  purpose  acquisition.  Unfortunately,  judicial  interpretations  of  the  law  have  only 
facilitated its misuse. As to the issue of whether acquisition or transfer of land to a company 
serves public purpose or not,  for the most part the judiciary has left it to the discretion of the 
executive  -  it is true that courts have annulled some acquisitions, but largely  on procedural 
grounds.
2 Since 1960s, the judiciary has allowed acquisition for companies to qualify as public 
purpose acquisition, as long as a part of the compensation cost is paid out of the state exchequer.
3 
So much so that in Indrajit C Parekh Vs State of Gujarat AIR 1975 SC 1182 the SC upheld an 
incredibly bizarre contention of the Gujarat government who claimed that a contribution of even 
one rupee from the exchequer is sufficient to validate the acquisition for a private company 
                                                 
1 Kaur (2010) provides many examples of land acquisition for essential private activities of companies. 
2 Very recently though the higher judiciary seems to have woken up to the abuse of the acquisition laws by the 
states, especially after the prolonged and violent protests by Bhatta -Parsaul farmers.  While reprimanding the UP 
government for unnecessary use of the emergency clause, on June 28 the Supreme Courts expressed serious dismay 
at  the  wide -spread  misuse  of  the  land  acquisition  laws .  (Hindu  accessed  at 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2139144.ece on September 13, 2011). Since April 2011, courts have 
struck down acquisition of more than 1000 hectares of land acquired for development projects in the Greater Noida 
area alone. 
3 See Smt Somawati & Others Vs. State of Gujrat  AIR 1963 SC 151, and  Devinder Singh & Others Vs. State of 
Punjab & Others  2008(1) SCC728, among others.   5 
 
under Part II! Unsurprisingly, in order to justify acquisition for companies under Part II, the 
states  have  been  contributing  nominal  amounts  toward  the  cost  of  acquisition.  Some 
governments have gone to the extent of contributing just Rs 100!
4  
In such a scenario, the states have been able to violate the law with impunity. In fact, they have 
competed to ‘outperform’ one another in acquiring land for private companies who clearly find it 
profitable  to  use  the  state  machinery  to  acquire  land  at  subsidized  rates.    There  are  many 
instances in which the states acquired land ostensibly for the use of a government department but 
eventually transferred it to companies. For instance, in 2002 the Haryana government acquired 
land to construct a Metro rail line, evidently a public purpose. However, after acquisition as 
much as 90 percent of the land was transferred to private developers.  In another illustrative 
instance, about 1500 acres of high-value agriculture land in close vicinity of Gurgaon city was 
acquired quoting public-purpose, namely for development of an industrial complex. However, 
later  the land was transferred to the Reliance SEZ, a project whose future is uncertain even after 
a lapse of 5 years. In the state of UP also there are several instances in which the government 
acquired land in the Greater Noida area citing some public purpose but ultimately diverted it to 
the builders. Besides, the states have been routinely misusing the de-notification clause to grant 
mid-way  exemption  to  the  properties  of  the  powerful  from  acquisition.  Indeed,  the  recent 
controversies over land acquisitions in the UP, Haryana and Karnataka are due to such misuses.   
2.2 Disputes and Litigation over Compensation In addition to the problems discussed above, 
the use of the eminent domain in India is invariably followed by disputes and litigation over 
compensation. To put the relevant issues in perspective, the LAA entitles the affected owners to 
the ‘market value’ of their property. In practice, for the purpose of compensation the market 
value of a property is determined on the basis of what are called ‘circle rates’ (popularly known 
as registry rates)
5  and/or the sale-deed of a similar property. In several judgments, the higher 
judiciary has held that the market value should be determined on the basi s of the circle-rate or 
the registered sale-deed of a similar property, whichever is higher.
6 The problem, however, is 
that the circle-rates are perpetually outdated and well below the market rates. Sale-deeds are also 
under-valuedsince, in order to save on stamp-duty charges, the price reported in a sale -deed is 
generally less than the actual transaction price. Moreover,  for agricultural land the market price 
                                                 
4 For more on misuse of the law by the state to favour private companies see Gonsalves (2010), Mihir (2011) and 
Nielsen (2011). For misuse of acquisition laws in general see Morris and Pandey (2007) and in West Bengal see 
Sarkar (2007). For weakening of property rights in India see Singh (2006). 
5 These rates are determined by the state government, and  differ across the categories of land.   A circle rate is the 
minimum rate for the official valuation of a property. So, the registered transaction price quoted in sale-deeds cannot 
be lower than the circle rate.  
6 See for instance, The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty (AIR 1959 SC 429), K.S. 
Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala, (AIR 1995 SC 1012). Panna Lal Ghosh & others vs Land Acquisition Collector & 
Others decided on 12 December, 2003 vize Appeal (civil) 9734 of 2003; Rameshwar Solanki & others vs. UOI & 
Others, AIR 1995 Delhi 358; and Tindey and Others vs. UOI & others, 2000(54) DRJ(DB) 384; and Jasrath Vs. 
Union of India 130 (2006) DLT700, among others. 6 
 
itself is acutely suppressed. This is due to a set of unreasonable restrictions imposed by the 
change-in-land-use (CLU) regulations. Therefore, the sale-deeds as well as the circle rates under-
represent the true market-value of land. Moreover, the circle-rates are lower than the sale-deed 
rates. Nonetheless, the land acquisition collectors (LACs) – the officer responsible for awarding 
compensation to the affected parties – routinely award compensation on the basis of the circle-
rates.  This  is  the  primary  reason  behind  the  inadequacy  of  the  government  provided 
compensation and  associated disputes. 
The excessive litigation under the existing law is due to the fact that the LACs and courts use a 
different basis for determining compensation, though the LAA provides the same set of rules to 
be followed by both the entities. While the LACs use the circle-rates, courts tend to use relatively 
high-value  sale-deeds  as  the  basis  for  determining  compensation.  Consequently,  the  court 
awarded compensation is consistently higher. An analysis of judgments of the ADJ courts in 
Delhi confirms this claim. The analysis is based on the available 525 judgments delivered over 
three years; 2008, 2009 and 2010.
7 Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. As the table 
shows, for every single adjudicated case, the court awards are at least equal to the LAC award. 
For as much as  86 percent of the cases, the court awards are strictly greater than the LAC 
awards.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of ADJ Courts (Delhi) awards 
Land Type  Number  %of  Cases 
with  Court 
awards>LAC 
award 
%  Increase  in  Compensation 
by court 
%  Increase  in  Compensation  by  court, 
conditional on positive increase 
Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min  Max  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min  Max 
Agriculture  470  90.21  18.36  49.53  0  427.63  20.35  51.76  1.0  427.63 
Residential  12  83.33  29.47  38.72  0  109.09  35.36  40.01  9.1  109.09 
Commercial  13  46.17  33.09  45.66  0  109.09  71.69  41.04  30  109.09 
Others  30  73.33  49.21  131.91  0  514.28  67.11  150.9  1.41  514.28 
Total  525  86.09  20.57  56.68  0  514.28  23.44  59.95  0.20  514.28 
Source: The ADJ Courts (Delhi)  awards made in 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
Preliminary research suggests that this is an all India phenomenon. In some cases, the difference 
between the LAC award, on the one hand, and the judiciary awarded compensation, on the other 
hand, is really startling. Here are a few examples: 
                                                 
7 As available at http://delhicourts.nic.in/ and downloaded during January-April 2011. 7 
 
In C.E.S.C. Limited vs Sandhya Rani Barik and Ors, 2008,
8 the judiciary increased compensation 
rate substantially. The LAC had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs 50,000 per -cottah. In 
contrast, the judiciary awarded compensation at the rates of 2,25,000 per -cottah. In Kanta Devi & 
Ors vs State Of Haryana & Anr
9 the compensation rate was increased from Rs 40,000 per-acre (by 
the LAC) to Rs 3,84,000 per-acre. In Revenue Divisional Officer-Cum-L.A.O. Vs. Shaik Azam 
Sahem
10 the Supreme Court increased compensation rate from Rs. 16,000 to Rs. 1,41,666.66 per-
acre! 
Understandably, the acquisition affected people have strong incentives to go for litigation. In 
fact, those who can afford, approach the higher judiciary and demand further enhancement in 
compensation. In many cases, the owners succeed  in  getting even higher compensation.  For 
example, in 96 percent of the judgments delivered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court during 
2009-10, the court awarded compensation is higher than the LAC award. Moreover, the average 
judicial awards are 342 percent higher than the LAC awards!  
However,  regardless  of  its  appeal  to  the  affected  owners,  litigation  involves  unnecessary 
spending of social resources. That is, from a social perspective it is  an inefficient means of 
enhancing compensation. Indeed, as is demonstrated in the next section, litigation is intrinsically 
pro-rich and against the poor. The poor farmers and the forest dwellers as such cannot afford the 
legal expenses. Moreover, many a times, there are no or very little transactions in the agricultural 
land in rural areas and in the forest lands. Consequently, there is very little scope for these people 
to use litigation to get higher compensation.
11  These people have no option but to take to the 
street to resist acquisition as such, at times leading   to dreadful consequences as have been 
experienced in Nandigram, Singur and some other parts of the country. 
3. Inefficiency and Abuses of the Eminent Domain: There are no easy ways out 
Section 2.1 shows that the self-interested uses of the compulsory acquisition laws have played a  
major role in making the outcome as bad as it has become. However, there are inherent problems 
with the use of eminent domain. This section shows that the eminent domain can guarantee 
neither efficiency nor fairness of the outcome, even if the decision makers are honest and want to 
use  it  to  further  social  welfare.  Moreover,  there  are  no  easy  ways  out  of  the  abuses  and 
inefficiency of the eminent domain.  
3.1 The Inherent Problem In principle, the process of transfer of land from agriculture to non-
agricultural  ends  can  take  several  forms.  For  instance,  it  could  be  based  on  pure  voluntary 
                                                 
8 C.E.S.C. Limited vs Sandhya Rani Barik and Ors, 2008, INSC 1036 decided on 7 July 2008. 
9 Decided by Supreme Court on 8 July, 2008. 
10 Decided on 13 January, 2009. 
11 However, the market transactions in the agricultural land adjacent to or near the urban areas do exist. That is why, 
the owners of agricultural land in Delhi have been able to produce sale -deeds and get higher compensation through 
litigation. 8 
 
transactions whereby the people desirous of buying agricultural land directly negotiate the sale  
price with the owners of the land. Or, the process could allow for compulsory acquisition of land, 
as is the case with the standard use of  eminent domain. Or, it could be a complex mix of these 
two processes. For any given process of land transfer to be ‘just’, it should compensate the 
adversely affected parties so that they are left no worse off. This in particular requires that the 
owners should get compensation at least equal to their individual valuation of their respective 
properties. For the process to be efficient, the process should allow a land transfer if and only if 
the total benefits from doing so are greater than the sum total of the resulting costs. The benefits 
can be private as well as public. The same is the case with the costs, which can be divided into 
three broad categories: First, the costs to the owners of the land in question due to loss of asset 
ownership. These costs can be taken as the sum of valuation of the land by the owners plus the 
cost of dispute and litigation borne by the owners. Second, costs to the non-owners who lose 
livelihood due to the transfer in question. Third, the remaining third-party/external cost; such as, 
the  environmental  damage  caused  by  the  alternative  use  of  the  land,  the  social  cost  of  the 
disputes and litigation instigated by the transfer process, etc. As is demonstrated below, the 
litigation and disputes over land transfer impose huge social costs  on the society, apart from the 
costs directly borne by the litigant owners. However, these costs crucially depend on the transfer 
process used. Therefore, the choice of the process is critical for the efficiency as well as the 
fairness of the outcome.  
The  primary  advantage  of  the  eminent  domain  or  any  process  involving  its  use  is  that  the 
problem of hold-up does not arise. Since, the properties are compulsorily acquired, regardless of 
the intensity of unwillingness of the owners to part with their property. In principle, the process 
can ensure efficiency also, by making the buyer internalize all of the above discussed costs. For 
instance, the state can make the buyer compensate all of the livelihood losers on account of land 
acquisition. However, for an eminent domain based process to be efficient and fair the state must 
be able to get information about the benefits as well as all of the costs of the land transfer. The 
problem is that the state lacks the relevant information on the costs as well as the benefits.  
The first and foremost is the lack of information about individual valuation of the owners, i.e., 
the price at which they are willing to sell their property - by definition, a compulsory acquisition 
implies lack of an actual voluntary transaction which could reveal the value of the property to its 
owner. So, in practice, most eminent domain laws require the compensation to be equal to the 
‘market’ value of the property, plus a solatium. The market value is taken as the price that the 
property will fetch in the market under existing conditions, if it were put up for sale. In reality, 
this value is determined by taking the average of the sale deeds of ‘similar’ properties.  Due to 
several reasons, the awarded compensation is invariably different from the value of the property 
to  its  owner.  First  of  all,  many  attributes  of  a  property  affect  its  market  value  and  no  two 
properties are exactly identical. Identification of similar properties and, therefore, the market 
price of the acquired property is a genuinely difficult task vulnerable to errors. Several empirical 9 
 
studies confirm that the actual compensation received by the owners of acquired properties is 
generally different from their market value. (See, e.g., Burger and Rohan (1967), Munch (1976), 
Bell and Parchomovsky (2007), Aycock and Black (2008)). Moreover, even if it were possible to 
determine the market value correctly, it will not help much to fix compensation at the so called 
market value. Since, a property of given market value is valued differently by different owners.
12 
In this scenario, there is inescapable variance between  the awarded compensation, on  the one 
hand, and the actual valuation of affected owners, on the other hand. This divergence, however, 
leads to two adverse implications. One, the fairness of the compensation cannot be guaranteed.
13 
Two, the land transfers may take place though it is not efficient to do so even from a pure cost -
benefit standpoint. It is also possible that land transfer does not take place, though it would be 
efficient. Between the two scenarios, however, for the reasons discussed below the first one is 
more likely.  
Indeed, there are even more serious problems with  eminent domain which have been ignored by 
the literature on the subject. Compulsory acquisition is inherently prone to litigation which, in 
turn,  has  serious  implications  in  terms  of  efficiency  and  fairness.    As  discussed  above, 
identification of similar properties that have been transacted is a genuinely difficult task, even if 
the state agents are competent and honest. Many a times, several properties can be claimed to be 
identical to the property in question. So, the owner can always find a property wit h price higher 
than the compensation received, and claim the higher price property to be identical to his own. 
So, there is always a scope to litigate for higher compensation; unless the officer -in-charge 
identifies all of even vaguely similar properties and uses the one with the highest rate to award 
compensation.  In  practice,  the  government  officials  responsible  for  making  the  initial 
compensation awards do not have incentives to assiduously search for adequate market value of 
acquired properties. They pl ay it safe and award compensation based on circle -rates or a 
relatively low-value sale deed. This means that the owners stand very good chance of winning 
during litigation, as they can use the high-value sale deeds as evidence in support of their claim.  
However, litigation entails unnecessary spending of a great deal of money and other human 
resources by the acquisition affected parties as well as by the state. Therefore, it is an inefficient 
means of providing compensation.  Moreover, litigation is social ly regressive; it is much more 
profitable for the owners of the relatively high-value properties than for those owning low-value 
properties. The relatively high-value property owners can gain more by putting in a lot of effort 
during litigation – in terms of choice of the quality of lawyers, search for high-value sale-deeds 
and other evidence needed to prevail in the court, etc. In contrast, the gains from litigation efforts 
are relatively low for the low-value property owners. So, the court compensation is expected to 
                                                 
12 In any case, the value of a property to its owner is greater than its market value; otherwise he would have already 
sold it.  
13 From the perspective individual sovereignty no compensation is adequate to justify involuntary acquisition. (See 
Sarkar 2011). 10 
 
be  relatively  large  for  the  high  value  properties.
14  The results reported in Table 1 provide 
empirical, though only a preliminary, support to this conjecture; the gains from litigation are 
higher  for  the commercial  and  residential  (plausibly  h igher value) properties than for  the 
agricultural land.
15  
Things are even worse for farmers and the forest dwellers. As was remarked earlier, there is very 
little scope for these people to use litigation to get higher compensation. Since for large tracts of 
agricultural and forest lands there are no or very little market transactions which could be used to 
claim higher compensation.   The poor as such cannot afford litigation. In  the Indian context, 
what makes things particularly bad is the fact that the burden to prove the market value is on the 
owner, notwithstanding the fact that all of the relevant information  - records of the sale-deeds, 
land-type, etc. – is solely possessed by the government.  
3.2 There are no easy ways out The above discussion shows that there are serious problems with 
the compulsory acquisition of land. However, before a downright condemnation of the eminent 
domain, the following question needs to be addressed. Can there be an eminent domain based 
process  or  mechanism  that  is  free  from  the  above  discussed  problems? Several  works  have 
advocated  the  state  intervention  in  the  transfer  of  land  from  agricultural  to  non-agricultural 
purpose. The state intervention is sought to protect the rights of the farmers (Banerji, at el 2007, 
Bhardhan 2011), or to provide compensation in the form of land for land (Gangopadhyay, 2011). 
Recently, Ghatak and Ghosh (2011) have proposed an auction mechanism based use of eminent 
domain. The process is claimed to be free from the above discussed problems with compulsory 
acquisition of land. In particular, the claim is that the proposed scheme: induces true reporting of 
valuation of land by the owners, i.e., the price at which the owners are truly willing to sell their 
property; is fair as the project affected owners get to choose the form of compensation either as 
cash or as land-for-land, and the cash compensation is at least equal to the value of the property 
to its owner; is least coercive in that the state force is used to relocate only those owners who 
refuse to accept land-for-land. Obviously, the claimed qualities are quite appealing.  In view of 
these virtues, the authors argue that the suggested form of the state intervention is desirable, 
regardless of whether land acquisition is for a public or private purpose. (See G&G first para, 
page 66, and third para page 69).   
Indeed, Ghatak and Ghosh (2011) (G&G, hereafter) is a noteworthy contribution. The proposed 
mechanism is an innovative way of combining a market device (the auction mechanism) and of 
the eminent domain. The proposed combination possesses several desirable features, and is an 
important  step  towards  solving  the  vexing  problems  associated  with  the  standards  use  of 
compulsory acquisition. Under certain conditions, the mechanism produced outcome does hold 
                                                 
14 A formal model of litigation under eminent domain is developed in Singh (2011). 
15  Note, however, that the residential and commerci al properties constitute only a small fraction of the total 
population. Therefore, the results should be taken as only an indicative support to the claim. 11 
 
the  above  mentioned  highly  desirable  properties.  However,  there  several  other  contexts  too 
which pose serious challenges to the intended functioning of the mechanism. Therefore, it is 
important to carefully analyse the mechanism and its implications before using it. Some of the 
relevant issues are pointed out by G&G themselves. In the following, I examine the properties of 
the outcome under the G&G mechanism for several land acquisition contexts. The underling 
motivation is to contribute to a better understanding of the consequences that will follow from 
the  use  of  the  mechanism.  I  argue  that  in  several  contexts  of  land  acquisition  that  are  of 
significant practical interest the mechanism in its present form does not deliver the intended 
benefits.  Moreover,  it  is  vulnerable  to  some  of  the  problems  associated  with  the  standard 
compulsory acquisition. It is important to address these issues before using the mechanism.  
The G&G mechanism: An assessment The G&G mechanism requires state intervention in an 
area double the size of the project site. To illustrate, consider a project that requires n contiguous 
acres of land.  Under the mechanism, the intervention area will consist of these n acres and 
another n acres surrounding them. The project site is to be called the core and the surrounding n 
acres,  the  periphery.    Assuming  that  a  farmer  owns  only  one  acre,  implementation  of  the 
mechanism requires the following steps: First, each farmer is asked to submit a (sealed) bid, that 
is, the price at which he is willing to sell his acre. Second, these bids are opened and arranged in 
an ascending order. Third, the n acres with the lowest bids are procured at a uniform price. The 
purchase price is called the auction price, and is to be equal to the lowest bid price among the 
acres that remain un-purchased. That is, the auction price is equal to the n+1th bid when bids are 
arranged in an ascending order. If only c of the sold n acres are from the core, this means that  n-
c of the core acres had higher bids than the n lowest bids. At the same time, n-c of the periphery 
acres had bids  among the  n lowest  bids.  The final step requires  the  government  to  make  a 
reallocation of the land as follows: The n-c farmers in the core, i.e., the ones with the higher bids, 
are  relocated  to  the  n-c  periphery  acres  that  were  among  the  lowest  n  bids  and  have  been 
purchased. A reserve price is fixed such that if the auction price turns out to be greater than the 
reserve price, the entire acquisition exercise is abandoned. 
It will help to discuss the mechanism with the help of a simple example.  
Example. Suppose setting up of an industrial project requires 5 contiguous acres of land, at a 
specific location. Following the description in G&G, let the demarcated area contain a total of 10 
acres; the 5-acres core as the project site and another 5 acres surrounding it. Let 10 different 
farmers own these acres. Different farmers value their land differently. In principle, individual 
valuations can and will differ in numerous ways. For the ease of illustration, however, suppose 
individual valuations take the following values: 1 lakh, 2 lakhs,…, and 10 lakhs. Let us call the 
farmer with valuation of land equal to 1 lakh as farmer 1, the one with valuation equal to 2 lakhs 





th and the 10
th farmers are located in the core; the remaining ones are in the periphery. 
Let, the government announced reserve price be 6.5 lakhs. 12 
 
This hypothetical example captures the essential attributes of the contexts discussed in G&G; 
namely, the land required for developmental projects needs to be contiguous, and   individual 
valuation of land differs substantially across the owners.
16 Moreover, the numbers used here can 
be changed in numerous ways, without diluting the force of the arguments produced below.  
Before proceeding further, it is pertinent to add that G&G assume that owners are heterogeneous 
in terms of their valuation of the land. But, all land plots of t he same size are assumed to be 
perfect substitutes of one another. That is, owners are assumed to be completely indifferent 
between (have the same valuation for) any two of the same-size parcels. So, in the context of our 
example, farmer 1 finds each of the 10 acres worth 1 lakh. Similarly, in view of farmer 2, each 
acre is worth 2 lakhs, and so on. 
According to G&G, their mechanism “gives the farmer a strong incentive to bid truthfully, i.e., 
ask for a compensation amount for which he is truly willing to part with his plot, instead of 
strategically  inflating  his  asking  price.”  (See  G&G,  second  para  page  68).  Moreover,  the 
mechanism is claimed to be efficient in that it reallocates the land in a most efficient manner. To 
quote, “Our proposed method is designed to kill two birds with one stone. First, it determines a 
fair price not through government fiat but through a participatory process of competitive bidding 
where farmers are free to name their own price and choose their form of compensation (cash or 
land). Second, it fills in for missing or imperfect land markets in the region by reallocating the 
remaining  farmland  to  those  who  place  the  highest  economic  value  on  such  an  asset.”
17  
(emphasis added here). 
In the context of our example, these claims imply the following: There is no collusion among the 
farmers;  each farmer bids his true valuation of his land, i.e., the first farmer reports it to be 1 
lakh, the second reports 2 lakhs and so on; land belonging to farmers numbered 1, 2, …, 4 and 5 
is purchased at a uniform price of 6 lakhs each;  farmer numbered 7 and 10 are relocated from 
the core to the acres sold by farmers 3 and 4 in the periphery – farmer 7 gets land sold by 3 and 
farmer 10 gets land sold by 4, or the other way around; farmers numbered 6, 8  and 9 keep 
holding on to their respective acres. The reallocation of land in the periphery is efficient in that it 
is reallocated among farmers who place highest value on it, i.e., farmers 6,…,10. 
First of all, the possibility of collusion among farmers cannot be ruled out altogether, especially 
when in a typical land acquisition context the affected owners are located next to one another, 
and have a collective and interactive social life.  
                                                 
16 Indeed, absent the contiguity requirement, there will be no need for the state intervention at all. On the other hand, 
if individual valuations of land are roughly equal, then the problem boils down to determining the average valuation, 
may be from the voluntary market transaction of a similar property. In that case, fair compensation can be provided 
by setting it little above the average valuation. The compensation so determined will allow the affected owner to buy 
similar property from the market.  
17 See page 69, first paragraph. 13 
 
Even if the issue of collusions is set aside and a private value environment is assumed, the 
mechanism  can  fail  to  induce  true  valuations  when  individual  valuations  differ  across  land 
parcels. Moreover, it can fail to be efficient in the sense of the claim cited above. In the real 
world, individual valuations differ on account of a host of factors, such as, location, quality of 
soil  and  underground  water,  availability  of  irrigation,  connectivity  to  market,  among  many 
others. Even if one were to assume that land parcels are identical in these aspects, people may 
still value them very differently. Many a time individual valuations differ across land parcels due 
to personal or non-replaceable factors. For instance, people tend to have sentimental attachment 
with their property, especially when it is an ancestral property. So, ceteris paribus, an ancestral 
property is valued more than the other properties. Moreover, individual valuations can differ 
across land parcels due to non-personal reasons as well. For example, controlling for all other 
relevant factors, strategically located parcels are valued more than the others.  
Suppose, in our example the land owned by farmer 7 is an ancestral property, and his valuation, 
7 lakhs, is partly attributable to this aspect of his land. His maximum valuation of any another 
acre which is not an ancestral property is 4 lakhs, even if it happens to be identical to his land in 
all other respects. Alternatively, if you are not persuaded by the ancestral property argument, 
think of a scenario in which there are several developers eying the land of farmer 7. It has 
become crucial for several small projects. Some of the potential buyers have even offered him 
close  to  7  lakhs  for  his  land.  Realizing  the  strategic  advantage  of  his  land,  he  would  not 
voluntarily sell it for less than 7 lakhs. His valuation of a non-strategically located acre in the 
periphery is just 4 lakhs, even though it is identical in all other relevant respects. In either of 
these scenarios, how much will farmer 7 bid under the G&G mechanism?  
Even  if  we  assume  that  all  other  farmers  will  bid  truthfully,  farmer  7  can  be  better-off 
unilaterally mis-reporting his valuation. To see how, recall the reserve price is 6.5 lakhs.  Now, 
consider a choice between true reporting by farmer 7, on one hand, and under-bidding of 4 lakhs 
or slightly above this amount, on the other. If the project goes through and he had reported 
truthfully, he is sure to be relocated to an acre which to him is worth no more than 4 lakhs. In 
contrast, had he under-reported slightly above 4 lakhs and got his land acquired, his payoff 
would have been higher – equal to the auction price.  
It is important to note that depending on the profile of individual valuations, (and assuming that 
the other farmers will bid truthfully)  a unilateral under-reporting by farmer 7 can affect the 
project  outcome,  i.e.,  whether  the  project  goes  through  or  not,  which,  in  turn,  depends  on 
whether the auction price turns out to be less than the reserve price or not. For instance, suppose 
the profile of individual valuations were (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.9, 7, 8, 9, 10). Since the reserve price is 
6.5 lakhs, the project will not go through if farmer 7 reports truthfully, as in that case the auction 
price (6.9 lakhs) will be greater than the reserve price. In contrast, a unilateral under reporting 
(say 4 lakhs) by farmer 7 will lower the auction price to 5 and the project will go through. In 
contrast,  for  many  possible  profiles  of  individual  valuations  a  unilateral  under-reporting  by 14 
 
farmer  7  does  not  affect  the  project  outcome.  The  profile  of  valuations  considered  in  our 
example, i.e., (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) is one of the many possibilities. For this profile, a 
unilateral under-reporting  (say 4 lakhs) by farmer 7 does not affect the project outcome. But this 
under-reporting at 4 lakhs is a more profitable choice for him that true reporting, as it enables 
him to sell his land at the auction price of 5 lakhs which is greater than his valuation of land in 
the periphery. However, note that for farmer 7 the payoff is highest (at 7 lakhs) if the project 
does not go through – if project goes through his payoff can be at most 6.5 lakhs. In particular, 
note that for profile (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.9, 7, 8, 9, 10) farmer 7 is worse off under-reporting at 4 lakhs 
compared to true reporting.
18  In such a scenario, i n a typical private value environment that 
allows various possible profiles of individual valuations  including the two mentioned here, for 
farmer 7,  bidding  4 lakhs or 7 lakhs cannot be   a dominant strategy. The optimum bidding 
response for him will depend  on his beliefs about the (probability)  distribution over individual 
valuations. For many possible beliefs of farmer 7, the effect in terms of the increased probability 
can be of second order compared to the gains from avoiding relocation by mis -reporting. So, 
farmer 7 can be better off under-reporting. An under-reporting by farmer 7 clearly goes against 
the claim of truthful revelation.  
The mechanism induced reallocation of land in the periphery can be inefficient, for those beliefs 
of farmer 7 about probability distribution of individual valuations in which he reports truthfully 
and the project goes through. To illustrate, if the individual valuations are as mentioned above, 
by reporting truthfully, farmer 7 gets relocated to the periphery where his valuation of land is just 
4 lakhs. But then the redistribution of land is not efficient, since the reallocated land goes to a 
farmer (i.e., farmer 7) who is not among the relatively high-value farmers any more, in contrast a 
farmer with higher valuation of land (farmer 5) does not get it. 
Expectedly, some other farmers may also have idiosyncratic component to their valuation of 
land. In general, if farmers in the core put different value on their own acres than those in the 
periphery, the claim regarding truthful bidding can get violated in several possible ways. As the 
auction/compensation price depends on the submitted bids, untruthful reporting of valuations has 
immediate consequences for the fairness of compensation and the  efficiency of the outcome 
under the mechanism.   
From a related perspective, it is easy to see that the mechanism’s outcome is not superior to the 
initial allocation in terms of the weak Pareto criterion as well, regardless of whether farmer 7 
reports truthfully or not. Since, the use of the mechanism to acquire land makes farmer 7 strictly 
worse-off– if he reports truthfully he gets relocated to a less valuable plot, and if he under-
reports, the compensation received by him is less than his true valuation. In contrast, if he is not 
                                                 
18 In these examples, the probability distributions of other farmers’ valuations are degenerate at particular values. 
However, it is easy to show that point is more general. 15 
 
forced to participate in the mechanism his pay-off would be at least 7 lakhs; he will sell his land 
only if he is paid at least this amount.  
The use of the mechanism is all the more challenging once it is recognized that the land parcels 
as such are heterogeneous. That is, even if the idiosyncratic issue and preferences are set aside, 
in  real  world  no  two  parcels  are  exactly  identical.  This  means  that  invariably  there  will  be 
differences between the land from which reluctant owners are uprooted and the one where they 
are relocated; in terms of locations of the lands, access to water resources, fixed investments, etc. 
Unsurprisingly, due to such differences, individual valuations will differ across parcels.  
Of course, G&G recognize the issues arising from the above sources of heterogeneity in land 
type. The authors propose ad hoc monetary compensation to make up for such differences, along 
with  the  land  for  land  for  those  who  submit  relatively  high  bids.  Besides,  to  account  for 
differences in the quality of lands, adoption of a conversion scale is suggested. (See G&G page 
68, 2
nd para).  
To illustrate the implications of the suggested measures, let us describe the individual valuation 
of a typical farmer for his own acre as v+s; where v  is his valuation of the land, and s is the 
sentimental value he attaches to it. (For example, for farmer 7,   and  .) If the farmer is 
in the core, let   be his valuation of an acre in the periphery – there are not sentiments attached 
to it. So,   captures the worth of (non-sentimental) differences between the two acres. Let,   
and   denote the expected values of the officially provided compensation on accounts of s and 
, respectively. In view of the discussion in Section 3.1, s varies across individuals and its 
determination by a third party is impossible. Also,   will vary across acres and it assessment 
is extremely difficult even if the state agents are sincere in their endeavor. This means that for 
farmers in the core, invariably    and  , therefore,    will hold, 
i.e., valuation of their own acre will be different from their valuation of the land in the periphery, 
even after factoring in the expected compensation. As demonstrated above, this difference has 
consequences  for  the  reporting  decisions.  In  generally,  neither  v+s  nor  v  is  necessarily  a 
dominant bidding strategy, so these values cannot be inferred from the submitted bids. As a 
result, there are efficiency implications as well. To demonstrate, a callous approach towards 
determination of compensation will have adverse consequences not only for those who have to 
be relocated, but also for those whose land gets sold through the auction. If people apprehend 
that they will be shortchanged during the relocation process, there will be a tendency to under-
report valuations; just like farmer 7 above, owners may prefer lower cash compensation, rather 
than facing the prospect of a painful relocation. If this happens, the land may get transferred to 
projects that are inefficient even on a utilitarian ground. Moreover, as discussed earlier, officially 
determined compensation invariably lead to litigation. 
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4. Voluntary Transactions versus Compulsory Acquisition 
4.1 Is one superior to the other? The previous section shows that the compulsory acquisition of 
land is seriously deficient on the grounds of efficiency as well as fairness. Moreover, many of the 
seemingly less coercive schemes involving the use of eminent domain are not as innocuous as 
they sound. Such processes inevitably require the state to determine the form and the magnitude 
of compensation - on account of quality, location and other differences between the type of land 
surrendered by the owners and the one given to them as a part of land-for-land, and for the 
execution of R&R packages. Therefore, even if the state agents are honest and capable, these 
schemes are as vulnerable to disputes and litigation and prone to failures on efficiency as well as 
fairness fronts, as is the case with the extant law. The abuses of the eminent domain reported in 
the previous section show that the assumption of a benevolent state is completely misplaced to 
say the least, especially when it comes to acquiring land for companies. Indeed, the use of the 
compulsory acquisition laws by the state governments has come to be dictated by the political 
and private interests, in total disregard to the legitimate interests of small farmers, poor workers 
and other people dependent on the land.   
Most  of  the  problems  associated  with  compulsory  acquisition  get  precluded  if  the  land  is 
transferred through voluntary transactions. By its very nature, a voluntary transaction ensures 
that the land transfer takes place only if the buyer can put it to a more profitable use than the 
existing owner. Besides, the owner receives a price which is at least equal to his valuation of the 
land. This means, controlling for the third-party effects, a voluntary transaction is strictly more 
efficient and fair than  compulsory acquisition; the latter can guarantee neither efficiency nor 
fairness of land transfer, even when the external effects are ignored. Moreover, a truly voluntary 
transaction takes place at a price that is agreeable to the parties involved. So, there is no scope 
for  ex-post  disputes  and  litigation  over  the  price  received  by  the  owner.  In  contrast,  under 
compulsory acquisition the price received by the owners is not of their choice; it is determined 
by use of arbitrary references, such as the circle-rates or the sale deeds. 
However, voluntary transactions as a means of land transfer have two limitations.  First, the 
buyers and sellers will typically ignore the third-party effects resulting from their transactions. 
This can be a source of serious concern. When agriculture land is put to non-agriculture ends, 
generally it affects a large number of non-owners – share croppers, agriculture workers, artisans, 
etc. In some cases, they end up losing their primary source of livelihood altogether. Nonetheless, 
the voluntary transaction between the buyers of land and the owner farmers will ignore these 
effects. Similarly, the voluntary transactions will generally not factor in the other third-party 
costs, such as damage to environment, etc.  
However, as far as the third party effects are concerned, whatever measures are available under 
eminent  domain  to  assess  and  mitigate  these  costs,  the  same  can  be  adopted  to  regulate  a 
voluntary transaction. For example, the buyer can be made to compensate the land dependent 17 
 
non-owners by the same amount as would be the case under the eminent domain –the LARR bill 
has adopted some such measures. Similarly, whatever clauses are used to regulate the activity of 
the  project  developer  buyer,  the  same  can  be  used  if  he  buys  land  through  a  voluntary 
transaction. So, as  far as  the third party  effects are concerned,  a voluntary transaction is  as 
efficient and fair as  eminent domain, when the same rules are applied under both  processes. 
Here it is pertinent to discuss one more argument used to argue for the state intervention in land 
transfers. It is argued that there is a potential case for the state intervention from the seller’s 
viewpoint as well. Absent the state protection, the sellers may end up getting a raw deal from the 
buyer (See, e.g., Banerji, at el 2007). For instances, when the buyer is a big corporation with 
strong bargaining power and/or better information about prospective use of land, but the sellers 
in contrast are small, dispersed and inadequately informed. In such circumstances, the state can 
intervene to protect the legitimate interest of the land owners. However, a similar protection can 
be provided to regulate voluntary transactions.  
In view of the above, when the direct and indirect effects of land transfer are considered together, 
regulated  voluntary  transactions  are  more  efficient  and  fair  than  the  compulsory  acquisition 
under eminent domain. Indeed, if there were well-functioning land markets, there will be no 
justification for the use of eminent domain. It is here that the second limitation of voluntary 
transactions becomes relevant. Voluntary transactions are vulnerable to various market frictions. 
The inertness of the market in agriculture land is attributed to high transaction costs on account 
of poor land records, and most importantly to the hold-up by the sellers/owners. It is the fear of 
strategic hold-up by the self-interested sellers - who want to extract an undue share of the surplus 
from the buyer - that is used to justify the state intervention and the compulsory acquisition of 
land. 
4.2 A Few Transactions in Agriculture Land: Is it all hold-out? While the property market in 
and near urban areas is very active, transactions in agriculture land in rural areas are rather 
infrequent. Certainly, high transaction costs owing to the poor land records and other market 
frictions limit the frequency of transactions in the agriculture land. However, there are other 
more crucial factors that severely restrict the scope of voluntary transactions in agriculture land. 
First of all, there is limited scope for a profitable transaction, as long as the land is to be used for 
agricultural purpose. While a potential buyer’s valuation generally depends on the economic 
gains  from  the  land,  for  the  seller  its  worth  depends  on  the  economic  as  well  as  personal 
considerations discussed above. To use an earlier description of the individual valuations, while 
the seller cares for v+s, the buyer is primarily interested in the first component of valuation. A 
transaction over a land parcel is likely to come about only if its economic value to the buyer is 
much more than to the seller. However, there is limit to which the economic worth of agricultural 
land  can  vary  across  individuals.    Since,  the  profitability  of  agricultural  land  does  not  vary 
considerably with the size of the holding; if anything, the data indicate existence of an inverse 18 
 
relationship  between  the  productivity  and  the  size  of  land  holding.
19  That  is,  the  buyer’s 
valuation, say v’, does not vary substantially across buyers. This means, generally, the buyer’s 
valuation, v’, does not exceed the seller’s valuation v+s. So, it is not surprising that very few 
transactions are observed wherein the seller and the buyer use the land for agricultural purpose. 
To the extent productivity differences arise - on account of differences in the access to banking 
system, labour-land ratio and technical/mechanical endowments of the parties - there is empirical 
evidence  suggesting  that  these  factors  do  play  significant  role  in  explaining  whatever  little 
transactions are observed in agricultural land.
20  
Presumably, major productivity differences arise when an agricultural land is used for non -
agricultural purposes, say to set up an industry or develop a housing complex, etc. However, the 
use of agriculture land for non -agricultural purposes is subject to several regulations. The 
decision  makers  use  these  regulations  to  extract  rent  from  the  project  sponsors.  As  is 
demonstrated in the following section, it is these  obstructive regulations that are responsible for 
the  absence  of  frequent  transactions  involving  transfer  of  agricultural  land  to  other 
developmental activities. When granted exemption from them, the project developers have been 
able to buy large trac ts of land through voluntary  transactions. Here are some illustrative 
examples.  
The developers of Gurgaon SEZ have been able to buy several pockets of hundreds of acres of 
contiguous agricultural land directly from the owners.
21 Similarly, the promoters of the Kakinada 
Special Economic Zone in Andhra Pradesh have bought as much as  4800 acre by directly 
negotiating with the farmers.
22 In Maharashtra, the Navi Mumbai SEZ developers have been able 
to  buy  several  thousand  acres  through  voluntary  transactions.
23  The  GMR  group  for  its 
Chhattisgarh project has purchased the 428 acres that it needed directly from the villagers. 
Indeed, there are  several other examples also where the project develo pers have successfully 
purchased hundreds of acres directly from the owners.
24  
These examples show that the seller hold-out is not inevitable even for large projects, provided a 
facilitating environment is created;  arguably  voluntary transactions are much more likely to 
succeed for small projects and those that have flexibility about the location. Therefo re, it is not 
                                                 
19 For discussion on this issue and survey of relevant literature see Gaurav and Mishra (2011). 
20 See Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan (2007). 
21 This is not to say that any amount of land can be purchased through voluntary transactions. The SEZ project has 
got stuck since the developer has failed to get the needed 10,000 acres of land, all contiguous.  
22  See  ‘ONGC  preparing  ground  for  Kakinada  refinery,  SEZ’,  available  at  ‘’ 
http://hindu.com/2006/12/15/stories/2006121508510300.htm, accessed on January 6, 2012.  
23 ‘RIL deals directly with farmers for SEZ land in state’ at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2007-01-
15/news/28483538_1_maha-mumbai-sez-purchase-land-stamp-duty. Accessed on November 28, 2011. Also, Status 
of MSEZ on http://www.docstoc.com/docs/26228984/MAHARASHTRA-SEZs accessed on January 6, 2012. 
24 For more examples see “Who tilled my land and ate my pie?” at http://www.rediff.com/business/slide-show/slide-
show-1-special-who-tilled-my-land-and-ate-my-pie/20110629.htm, accessed on October 20, 2011. 19 
 
plausible to attribute the lack of transactions in agriculture land only to the seller hold-out or 
other  market-frictions.  Such  a  misbelief  can  only  serve  to  justify  an  excessive  use  of  the 
compulsory acquisition laws.  
It must be granted that there is risk of hold-up for really large and the location specific projects. 
However, even for this set of projects the choice of compulsory acquisition is not immediate. 
There is a trade-off between the inefficiency on account of hold up, on one hand, and the earlier 
discussed inefficiency associated with the use of eminent domain, on the other hand. Moreover, 
the hold-up risk for large projects can be reduced substantially by lowering the transaction and 
the regulatory costs currently associated with land deals. The next section is devoted to these 
issues. 
Also,  the  threat  of  hold-up  has  been  overplayed  in  the  traditional  economic  literature.  The 
literature  has  posited  the  land  assembly  as  a  sequential  purchase  game.  That  is,  the  buyer 
approaches one owner at a time, buys his land, and then goes to the next owner. This means that 
by the time buyer negotiates for the last set of parcels, she has already invested large stakes, 
thereby falling hostage to exorbitant demands from the owners of the remaining plots. However, 
sequential  purchase  is  not  the  only  option  available  to  the  buyer.  Some  of  the  possible 
alternatives are discussed below.  
5. The Way Forward 
As demonstrated in previous sections, the use of the eminent domain even for partial acquisition 
and in its most benign forms providing land-for-land and R&R packages - is vulnerable to failure 
on the efficiency as well as fairness fronts. Moreover, it is inherently litigious. Therefore, instead 
of expanding the scope of the compulsory acquisition, as is the case with the LARR Bill, there is 
a need to  reduce it. At the same time, voluntary land transactions  need to  be facilitated by 
removing  institutional  and  regulatory  hurdles  that  thwart  a  large  number  of  voluntary 
transactions. This section offers some remedial measures. 
At  present,  the  use  of  agriculture  land  for  other  purposes  requires  what  is  called  the  CLU 
clearance from the state government, among many other regulatory clearances from the local 
authorities. Some of these regulations make the large scale purchases of land say for setting up of 
a big industry, totally impossible. To illustrate, the land ceiling regulation limits the size beyond 
which agricultural land cannot be owned. So, a project developer cannot buy and own agriculture 
land in its current use beyond this limit, which varies from state to state. Moreover, it is not 
possible to buy the required land by appealing to an alternative use (so as to avoid the ceiling 
regulation),  since  to  get  a  CLU  clearance  the  project  developer  should  possess  the  land 
beforehand. Therefore, the developers of big projects have no other option but to ‘persuade’ the 
state government concerned to acquire the land.   20 
 
Even when the land required for the project is within the permissible limits of the land ceiling 
rules, the regulatory hold-up is an equally serious issue. The other regulatory clearances are one 
of the primary sources of the rent seeking by the state politicians and bureaucrats.  The formal 
and  informal  (kickback)  costs  of  these  clearances,  especially  the  CLUs,  are  said  to  be  a 
significant component of the project costs. For the real-estate projects and also for small and 
medium  sized  industrial  projects  these  costs  are  comparable  to  the  cost  of  land  itself.
25. 
Unsurprisingly,  these  ‘regulatory’  costs  preclude  a  large  number  of  potentially  profitable 
transactions.  Moreover, they put heavy downward pressure on the price of transactions that still 
remain feasible, and thereby affect the distribution of surplus against the farmers.   
To see how, suppose there are two entrepreneurs. Each needs to buy one acre of land for her 
project. There are two farmers willing to sell their land. Each farmer values his (infra-marginal) 
acre at 80 lakhs. However, while the first entrepreneur finds each of the above acres of land 
worth 100 lakhs, the second one considers it worth 110 lakhs. In the absence of any regulatory 
costs, there is scope for two mutually beneficial transactions; each involving one of the farmers 
and one of the entrepreneurs. But, if the ‘rent-seeking’ costs of land use clearances are 25 lakhs 
per-acre, then the first entrepreneur’s net gains from the land are reduced to 75 lakhs, which is 
less  than  the  farmers’  valuation.  Consequently,  a  profitable  transaction  between  the  first 
entrepreneur  and  any  of  the  farmers  becomes  impossible.  In  contrast,  a  gainful  transaction 
between the second entrepreneur and any one of the farmers is still possible. However, now the 
entrepreneur would not pay more than 85 lakhs, i.e., his valuation of the land after factoring in 
the total regulatory costs; otherwise, he would have ended up paying any price up to 110 lakhs, 
depending on the bargaining skills of the farmer.
26 
Indeed, a large set of otherwise feasible transactions gets ruled out not due to the hold-out by the 
sellers but by the regulatory hold-up. This regulatory hold-up has greatly added to the tendency 
among project developers to bribe the state government concerned to use the eminent domain.  
When land is compulsorily acquired and given to a private company  in the name of a public 
purpose, the CLU clearances are not needed or are provided along with the land. Therefore, the 
project developers are better off bribing the powers that be and get it to acquire the needed land. 
In fact, this route has had added adv antage for the project developers. As the land price under 
eminent domain has been much lower than the market price, the developers have been getting 
land at a rate much cheaper than they would have ended up paying under voluntary transactions.  
Things can be much better if the institutional and regulatory infirmities are set right. The large 
scale purchases of land by the developers, as discussed in section 4.2, became possible  only due 
                                                 
25 See The Economic Times, ‘What's wrong with the real estate sector in India’, accessed on November 28, 2011 at 
at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/real-estate/realty-trends/whats-wrong-with-the-real-estate-sector-in-
india/articleshow/8786642.cms.  
26 Also note that the official rent seeking reduces the competition among buyers. 21 
 
to  the  fact  that  the  project  developers  were  granted  exemptions  from  the  CLU  and  other 
regulations.  There  is  need  to  replace  the  discretionary  and  devious  CLU  regulations  with 
transparent,  objective  and  ex-ante  zoning  regulations  setting  different  zone  for  different 
activities. As long as the land is used for the purposes permitted by these regulations, the state 
should have no role in further governing transactions.  
The  transactions  cost  of  direct  purchases  can  be  reduced  greatly  if  the  ownerships  are  well 
defined  and  land  records  are  clear  and  verifiable.  The  poor  land  records  and  the  resulting 
litigation  have  held  back  not  only  development  of  an  efficient  land  market,  but  the  overall 
development of the economy. There is urgent need to update and digitalized land records related 
to the ownership as well as the type of land. These records should be tamper-proof and made 
available publically, so that they can be used by the owners, the potential buyers and the courts 
for  verification  of  titles.  There  should  be  a  real-time  coordination  between  the  agencies 
responsible for registration of land deals and those responsible for maintenance of land records. 
These  measures  as  such  will  go  long  way  in  facilitating  voluntary  transactions  by  clearing 
uncertainty of over the ownership.
27 As for large projects, it is also conceivable to not to let any 
legal dispute over ownership obstruct the project, if the ownership at the time of purchase was 
not in dispute.  
Collective bargaining with the owners or their representatives seems to offer another important 
channel for reducing the transactio n cost. There are instances wherein the owners themselves 
have taken initiatives to pool and provide contiguous land.  For example, more than 1,000 
farmers from Avasari-Khurd villages along the Pune-Nashik pooled together about over 2,665 
acres to form a special purpose vehicle to set up a multi-product SEZ.
28 Indeed, there is a need to 
encourage collective bargaining. Besides, rather than focusing on transfers of land ownership 
itself, it will help to create a facilitating environment for  lease agreements over the land.
29 In 
additional to increasing availability of land for developmental purposes, s uch agreements have 
advantage  of  permitting  sharing  of  ownership  benefits  over  time   thereby  making  farmers 
stakeholders in the project rather land losers. Magarpatta City, a 400 acres complex developed by 
a co-cooperative of farmers is an illustrative case in point. Other possibilities also exist.
30 It will 
also help to legalize the contingent contracts for land deals. Under these contracts, the project 
developer can negotiate a ‘future sale contract’ with each owner. If the developer actually buys 
the  land,  the  agreed  price  is  paid  to  the  owner;  otherwise,  the  developer  pays  a  small 
compensatory amount to the owner to cover the time and negotiation costs incurred by the latter. 
                                                 
27 Moreover, the will help small farmers by easing the credit-market frictions for them, and will enable better 
targeting of government welfare programmes. 
28  See  ‘Farmers  to  set  up  own  SEZ  near  Pune’  at  http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-01-
19/india/27773144_1_sez-avasari-khurd-village-barren-land. Accessed on November 28, 2011. 
29 For some possibilities in this regard see Arun (2011). 
30 On the merits of participatory development see Bhaduri and Patkar (2009). 22 
 
These contracts will not eliminate the problem of hold-up altogether, but they can surely reduce 
its intensity. 
The problem is that these initiatives can be undertaken only by the state government concerned; 
since the land, its usage, and the contracts over land are all in the state-list. But, as discussed 
above, the decision makers in the state governments do not have incentive to reduce the scope of 
eminent domain. Serious thinking is required to incentivize the states to undertake the above 
reforms. Fortunately, the land acquisition is in the concurrent-list. This means that there is room 
for  a  centrally  enacted  land  acquisition  law  to  help  in  the  process  and  thereby  reduce  the 
potential for misuse of eminent domain. In particular, the central law can determine the scope 
and dictate the terms for compulsory land acquisition. Some helpful measures are proposed in 
the next section. 
In the recent past, states have exhibited a strong tendency to use assembled land to attract big 
projects. Several states have competed with one another in offering lucrative land deals to the 
developers, leading to a race to the bottom. The LARR in its present form does not address this 
serious issue, though it is imperative to do so. International experience shows that neither the 
sellers hold-out nor is land scarcity the leading cause for this race to the bottom.  
It is instructive to note that the use of the eminent domain for private projects is more frequent 
and controversial in the land abundant US than in the relatively land scarce and population dense 
England! How so? The local bodies in the US as well as in England have incentives to compete 
with one another to attract projects. However, in England there are several effective constraints 
on the use of land for the purpose. While the land acquiring authority is a local body, the power 
to grant permission for the use of eminent domain is a central authority. This authority, which is 
the office of the Deputy PM of the UK, makes sure that the local authorities do not engage in a 
race to the bottom. Moreover, before initiating the land acquisition process, the local authority 
has to publish, discuss and get the development plan approved by the local legislation. This 
means that for a local authority to be able to use the eminent domain powers, it has to prove 
preponderance of benefits over the costs resulting from the project at hand. A great advantage of 
this process is that the crucial issues, like desirability of acquisition, alternative locations, etc., 
get resolved beforehand. In contrast, in the US similar constraints on the use of eminent domain 
are amiss.
31 As a result, while the compulsory acquisition for private projects has become highly 
contentious in the US, by comparison, the authorities in England have rarel y encountered 
resistance to compulsory acquisition.  
Apart from the above measures, it is crucial that the entire cost of compensation is paid by the 
entity benefitting from the acquisition. Moreover, the compensation amount should be increased 
                                                 
31 For more on the comparison of the use of eminent domain in the US and England see Allen (2008) and Malloy 
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substantially. While it is almost impossible to determine and provide compensation equal to the 
valuation of land to its owners, it seems better to err on the higher rather the lower side. As 
discussed earlier, when compensation is different from the individual valuations, acquisition are 
very likely to be inefficient. However, this risk is much higher if the compensation is generally 
less than the individual valuations. Since, if the compensation rate appears to be too high, the 
developers  can  always  choose  to  go  for  direct  purchase  from  the  owners.  The  LARR  bill 
provides for an increase in the compensation. However, the proposed approach is rather faulty, a 
point discussed in the next section.  
6. The LARR: Additional Critique and Suggestions 
The LARR Bill has several laudable provisions. The most important is the creation of a legal 
entitlement to compensation and R&R not only for the owners but also for all other livelihood 
losers. All the same, the bill fails to address the above discussed fundamental causes behind the 
disputes and litigation over compulsory acquisition. Moreover, it opens up several backdoors for 
the  state  to  favour  companies  at  the  expense  of  farmers’  rights  and  livelihood  of  forest 
dwellers.
32   
True, the Bill has drastically reduced the scope of  the notorious emergency clause. However, as 
is demonstrated in the Section 2, the excessive use  of the emergency clause is but one of the 
several abuses of the extant law. As mentioned earlier, others abuses involve covertly diverting 
of the acquired land to companies, adoption of pick-and-choose method during acquisition, and 
the misuse of the de-notification clause to exempt land belonging to the powerful.  
Under the proposed  law the states  can  continue  with  these  practices  unabated. Doubtful? 
Consider the following provisions in the bill.  Section 69 allows the states to change the purpose 
for which the acquired land is finally used, that is, the public purpose can be changed after 
acquisition. Furthermore, Section 70 gives them unbridled power to transfer an already acquired 
land to private companies and individuals in the name of public purpose, as long as 20 percent of 
the resulting profit, if any, is shared with the original owners. As if this was not enough, Section 
61 allows for mid-way de-notification as well! These provisions together give the states untamed 
powers to acquire land in the name of some public purpose and transfer it to companies.  As to 
the sharing of 20 percent of the profit with the owners, the ministry seems to have learnt nothing 
from the insidious manipulation of accounts by companies. 
As  demonstrated  in  the  above  sections,  the   incentives  to  misuse  the  state  force  for  land 
acquisition are especially pronounced for the private projects. Therefore, the public -versus-
private distinction is important. The scope of compulsory acquisition for private projects needs to 
be reduced drastically. The use of the eminent domain for private projects should be restricted to 
large projects, by providing a lower limit for government intervention.    As the examples 
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produced in Section 5 show, the seller hold up is not a serious concern for small and medium 
size  projects.  On  top  of  it,  these  projects  have  flexibility  as  to  where  they  can  be  located. 
Unfortunately, the all-encompassing lists of public purpose activities in Sections 2(n) and 2(y) of 
the Bill dilute the crucial public-versus-private distinction. Thereby, the bill allows the states to 
intervene in acquisition and transfer of land to companies for all sorts of essentially private 
activities.  
For large projects there is a need to control the race to the bottom among the states. Given the 
federal structure of Indian politics, it is neither feasible nor advisable to have a central authority 
empowered to approve compulsory acquisition. However, it will help if the new land acquisition 
law  provides  an  independent  state  level  institution  to  discuss  all  relevant  project  details 
pertaining to its size, location, costs, benefits, form of compensation, R&R package, etc. Such a 
discussion  should  be  a  prerequisite  to  the  start  of  the  acquisition  process.  The  LARR  bill 
provides for a ‘Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority,’ (LARRA) as  a 
supervisory authority. But, LARRA’s role comes into play only ex-post. Moreover, most of the 
crucial decisions pertaining to Social  Impact  Assessment, R&R, etc. have been delegated to 
committees comprising of state level bureaucrats whose past performance leaves much to be 
desired. It is important that the final reviewing authority for crucial matters like SIA and R&R is 
an independent and representative body. 
As  Section  3  shows,  litigation  is  a  wasteful  and  socially  regressive  way  of  granting 
compensation. There is nothing substantial in the Bill to change the vicious cycle of litigation 
and the resulting wastage of private and public resources. The Bill unleashes conflicting forces in 
terms of  incentives for the affected parties to litigate, and thereby further complicates  matters. 
To put things in perspective, Section 25 of the existing LAA mandates that the court awarded 
compensation cannot be less than the LAC awarded compensation. The Bill, in contrast, provides 
no such safeguards to the litigant owners. So, under the proposed law, in principle, the court 
awards can be less than the LAC  awarded compensation.  Therefore, it makes  the choice of 
litigation a riskier proposition for the affected parties. However, this aspect of the new law per-se 
is not going to make it any less litigious, since there is nothing in the Bill to make the LAC 
determine  compensation  carefully.  The  LACs  will  continue  to  play  it  safe  by  awarding 
compensation on the basis of the low valued sale-deeds or the circle-rates. This means that the 
tendency of the affected parties to litigate the LAC awards will remain undiluted. Moreover, 
during litigation only the owners can dispute the compensation awards - the government cannot 
question  its  own  decision.  Therefore,  guided  by  the  legal  principle  of  the  prohibition  of 
reformatio in peius,
33 a court has to decide whether compensation can be increased or not. In this 
scenario, the court awards can be higher or at worst equal to the LAC awards, even in absence of 
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an explicit provision in the law. So, the acquisition affected people will continue to litigate. All 
that the bill does is replacement of the ADJ court with a ‘Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Authority,’ (LARRA) to adjudicate compensation related disputes. Substitution of 
one adjudication authority with another cannot reduce litigation.  
If anything, litigation is likely to intensify further. The Bill requires the compensation, including 
solatiam, to be four times the market value of the land for the rural areas; and two times the 
market value for urban areas. That is, for purpose of compensation the multiplier has been raised 
from 1.3 under the current law
34 to 2 and 4 for the urban and rural areas, respectively. To see 
why the increased multiplier will further intensify the litigation, consider an agriculture land 
measuring just 100 sq-meters. Under the extant law, since the multiplier is 1.3, if compensation 
is determined using a sale-deed rate of say Rs 1300, instead of circle-rate of say Rs 1000 per-sq-
meter, the total compensation will be higher by Rs 39,000. In comparison, under the proposed 
law since the multiplier is four, the compensation amount will go up by Rs. 1,20,000! So, under 
the proposed law the gains from litigation will be much more than is the case under the existing 
law, given the proclivity of the LACs and the courts to use  a different basis for determining 
compensation. The basis of determining compensation  – circle-rate versus sale-deeds, one sale-
deed versus the other – becomes increasingly crucial and worth litigating, as the land size and/or 
the difference among sale-deeds and circle rates increases. In fact, people privy to the official 
decisions can profit by ‘engineering’ the high value sale-deeds ahead the acquisition, as these 
sale-deeds can be used to get higher compensation. 
In order to avoid litigation, it is important that the initial compensation itself is determined in 
view of all of the relevant information, such as records of the sale-deeds, land-type, its future 
value, etc. All this information should be required to be shared with the affected parties before 
compensation  awards  are  made.  Here,  it  will  help  if  the  compensation  is  determined  by  an 
independent agency.  This agency should be required to use all of the above mentioned data 
relevant for determining compensation. Moreover, the agency can be made responsible for fixing 
and updating the circle-rates, in keeping with the increasing value of the land. If not updated 
regularly, the circle-rates can remain low relative to the value of the property and become even 
lower with the passage of time.  Therefore, the compensation can remain less than market value, 
even if it is set at a level several times the circle-rate.   
References 
Allen, Tom (2008): “Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A 
Comparative view” in Private Property, Community Development, and Eminent Domain. 
Robin Paul Malloy (Editor), Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Hampshire, England. 
                                                 
34 Under the LA Act 1894, the compensation is fixed at the market value –determined on the basis of circle rate or 
the sale deeds- plus a solatium of 30 percent, that is, the total compensation is 1.3 times the market value. 26 
 
Arun, TK (2011): “Alternative to land acquisition” The Economic Times, July 04, 2011, also 
available at http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/Cursor/entry/alternative-to-land-
acquisition?sortBy=recomended. 
Aycock, S. Alan, and Roy Black (2008): Special Master Bias in Eminent Domain Cases. Real 
Estate Issues 33:53–58. 
Banerjee, Abhijit V, Pranab Bardhan, Kaushik Basu, Mrinal Datta-Chaudhuri, Maitreesh Ghatak, 
Ashok Guha, Mukul Majumdar, Dilip Mookherjee, and Debraj Ray (2007): “Beyond 
Nandigram: Industrialisation in West Bengal”, Economic and Political Weekly, 42, 1487-
1489.  
Bardhan, Pranab (2011): “An uneven field”, The Hindustan Times. June 10, 2011.  
Bell, Abraham, and Gideon Parchomovsky (2007): ‘‘Taking Compensation Private,’’ 59 
Stanford Law Review 871–906. 
Bhaduri, Amit and Medha Patka (2009): “Industrialisation for the People, by the People, of the 
People”, Economic and Political Weekly, 44(1): 10-13. 
Burger, Curtis J., and Patrick J. Rohan (1967): ‘‘The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look 
into the Practices of Condemnation,’’ 67 Columbia Law Review 430–58. 
Chakravorty, Sanjoy (2011): “A Lot of Scepticism and Some Hope” , Economic and Political 
Weekly, 46(41), 29-31.   
Deininger, Klaus, Songqing Jin, and Hari K. Nagarajan (2007): “Determinants and 
Consequences of Land Sales Market Participation: Panel Evidence from India”. The World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4323.  
Desai, Mihir (2011): “Land Acquisition Law and Proposed Changes”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 46(26,27): 95-100.  
Duflo, Esther and Rohini Pande (2007): “Dams”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 601-
646.  
Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis (2011): “Land for Growth”, The Business Standard, September 24. 
Gaurav, Sarthak and Srijit Mishra (2011): “Size-class and Returns to Cultivation in India: A 
Cold Case Reopened” Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research Working Paper, 
WP-2011-027, available at http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2011-027.pdf, 
accessed on October 12, 2011.  
Ghatak, Maitreesh and Dilip Mookherjee (2011): “Land Acquisition for Industrialization and 
Compensation of Displaced Farmers”, WIDER Working Paper Vol. 2011-35.  
Ghatak, Maitreesh and Parikshit Ghosh  (2011): “The Land Acquisition Bill: A Critique and a 
Proposal”, Economic and Political Weekly, 46(41), 65-72. 
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 77-2011 (LARR, 2011): Web link: 
http://164.100.24.219/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/asintroduced/land%20acquisition%2077%20of
%202011.pdf.  
Malloy, Robin P. (2008): Private Property, Community Development, and Eminent Domain. 
(Edited), Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Hampshire, England. 
Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India (MRD, 2011): “The Draft National Land 
Acquisition Bill and Rehabilitation & Resettlement Bill, 2011.” Web link: 
http://www.rural.nic.in/Final.pdf.  
Morris, Sebastian and Ajay Pandey (2007): “Towards Reform of Land Acquisition Framework 
in India”, Economic and Political Weekly, June 2, 2083-90. 
 27 
 
Munch, Patricia (1976): ‘‘An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain,’’ 84 The Journal of 
Political Economy 473–97. 
National Advisory Council (NAC, 2011): “Proposals of Working Group for Consideration of 
NAC-II: Suggestion for Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill 2009 & Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation Bill 2009.” Web link: 
http://nac.nic.in/pdf/working_group_proposal_for_larr.pdf.  
Nielsen, Kenneth Bo (2011): “Land, Law and Resistance”, Economic and Political Weekly, 
46(41), 38-40.  
Ramanathan, Usha (2011): “Land Acquisition, Eminent Domain and the 2011 Bill” , Economic 
and Political Weekly, 46(44), 10-14.   
Sarkar, Abhirup (2007): “Development and Displacement: Land Acquisition in West Bengal”, 
Economic and Political Weekly, 42(16), 1435-42. 
Sarkar, Swagato (2011): “The Impossibility of Just Land Acquisition”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 46(41), 35-38.   
Sarma, E A S (2011): “Sops for the Poor and a Bonus for Industry” , Economic and Political 
Weekly, 46(41), 32-34.   
Singh, Jaivir (2006): “Separation of powers and the erosion of the right to property in India” 
Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 17 (4), 303-324. 
Thomas M.K. (2000), Public Sector Transport in India in the New Millennium: A Historical 
Perspective, Ebenezer Publishers, Pune.  
 
Data sources: 
http://www.judis.nic.in/ 
http://delhicourts.nic.in/ 
http://www.iasri.res.in/agridata/08data/foreword08/conversionF.pdf 